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Abstract 
South Africa’s decision to enter the First World War was not easy. After a 
difficult interplay between Whitehall and Tuinhuis, the Botha government 
agreed to secure limited strategic objectives in neighbouring German South 
West Africa. An armed insurrection had to be suppressed first. When both 
these objects were achieved, and following a further British appeal, South 
African troops moved further afield. This move, representing South Africa’s 
second ‘little bit’, was a dangerous step for the Botha government. The 
despatch of troops to France was controversial. Yet, by the end of 1915, 
South African expeditionary forces were en route to Europe and East Africa. 
This paper investigates the political crisis in South Africa and the difficult 
decision to send troops out of Africa, their deployment in an environment 
entirely foreign to the South African way of war, and the impact of the 
Western Front on the drawing of ‘lessons’ by post-war Union authorities. 
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Introduction: ‘Our Thermopylae, our Morgarten’ 
The title for this paper draws on two sources; one a letter from William 
Carter, the Archbishop of Cape Town, and the other a 21 July 1915 
newspaper call for volunteers to serve in France with a South African 
infantry brigade. For the Union of South Africa, which had a fortnight 
earlier brought the German South West campaign to a successful 
conclusion, this would be the country’s ‘second little bit’.1 The stance of the 
South African prelate, captured in his wartime correspondence with a cleric 
friend in Britain, was typical of other English-South Africans at the time. 
After succumbing easily to the wave of early-war enthusiasm, he had settled 
by mid-1915 into a new realism.2 The accounts of the fighting in Europe 
were terrible and, as he admitted, he did not understand how men could 
stand the brutality of it all. Yet, while he saw too that there were most 
probably ‘worse things to come’, he embraced the notion that the war was 
being fought for civilisation and justice and for these reasons, despite the 
horribleness, it was also ‘all splendid.’3 
Soldiers at the front, situated at the tactical level and subjected to the 
full experience of the trenches, shared other ideas. Lt Cyril Newton-
Thompson, a perceptive South African with the Royal Horse Artillery in 
France, derided the generals, the politicians, a gullible public, in fact 
everything about the war. Any gains would be more than offset by the 
losses, which, he lamented, would be appalling, 
‘The soldiers will have gone to their last long rest recking [sic] little of why it 
all was, except that they thought our cause the better, & it will be left to the 
historian & especially the student of military history to determine whether in 
the great offensive of June-July-August 1916 the game was worth the candle.’4 
As Newton-Thompson predicted, this question has drawn its historians and 
other commentators. For South Africa, the focus has always been, most 
specifically, Delville Wood. This tradition commenced on 18 July 1917, 
when a large crowd gathered at the Town Hall in Cape Town to mark the 
first Delville Wood Day. The tribute, offered ‘to the memory of the noble 
band of South Africans who … made the supreme sacrifice at Delville 
Wood under circumstances which have won imperishable glory for their 
country’, was, as the Cape Times reported, ‘most impressive … and in every 
respect … worthy of the great anniversary that it marked.’5 And it was a 
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great anniversary for several reasons. First, although only an episode on the 
Western Front, it was far more than that to the South Africa of the day. 
Delville Wood was, according to John X. Merriman, elder statesman and 
former Cape prime minister, ‘the first stiff fight’ in which the new Union 
Defence Force (UDF) ‘met under the most extreme conditions of modern 
warfare’ and where they showed ‘themselves not unequal to the dreadful 
task.’ The Somme and, more specifically, Delville Wood, was moreover a 
sacred place where South Africans stood, not only together, but with the rest 
of the British World, and halted German militarism. And therefore, although 
‘only an episode in the great strife’, it defined not only the grittiness of the 
South African soldier, but also South Africa’s place as a constituent of a 
larger British World and as part of the allied coalition that halted despotism. 
It was Merriman felt South Africa’s Thermopylae, her Morgarten.6 
This line has been assumed, both by soldiers and historians, with the 
result that Delville Wood, South Africa’s special part in the Battle of the 
Somme, looms large in South African military history. Contemporary 
soldiers played the first part in this construction. Major-General William 
Furse, commander of the 9th Division, of which the South African Brigade 
formed part, described the events around Longueval as ‘one of the greatest 
battles in the world’s history’, while Lieutenant-General Henry Rawlinson, 
his immediate superior, declared that ‘with the capture of Delville Wood, 
the gallantry, perseverance and determination of the South African Brigade 
deserves the highest commendation.’7 Delville Wood, almost inevitably, has 
been used by politicians and nation-builders of pre-1994 white South Africa 
and in a book, published in 2006, Delville Wood is, yet again, billed as one 
of the ‘seven battles that shaped South Africa.’8 
These constructions and the complicated nature of the South African 
deployment on the Western Front, divergent and often unconnected, have 
slanted the historical record. Several South African units and formations 
served in France during the Somme offensives. The 1st South African 
Infantry Brigade formed the core of this presence, but did not fight in the 
vicinity of the five batteries of heavy artillery or the signal company or, 
indeed, the South African General Hospital stationed near Abbeville. All 
were served by the men of the South African Native Labour Corps 
(SANLC). Besides, there were also South Africans in many British 
battalions and regiments and in the Flying Corps. Nevertheless, the focus of 
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the historian of South Africa’s part in the campaign has always been with 
the Infantry Brigade, which was not only the most visible South African 
contribution to the main battleground, but, to invoke Buchan, claimed ‘to 
have had no superior and not many equals.’9 More recently, these studies, 
often simply chronicling events, have been supplemented by studies of the 
activities of the SANLC, which arrived in France in late 1916, too late for 
the battle of the Somme.10 During the past decade, much new work has been 
done exploring both ‘identity’ as well as the meaning of the battle to a 
modern, collective, new South Africanism.11 
The aim of this paper, which draws on an array of official and private 
papers, is to investigate the South African experience of the battle of the 
Somme, cast against the background of the political crisis in South Africa 
and the difficult decision to send troops out of Africa and the deployment of 
these troops in an environment entirely foreign to the South African way of 
war. A small assemblage of South Africans, all second, third and lower-tier 
figures, are used as lenses through which to view these processes. They 
include William Carter (1850-1941), the archbishop of Cape Town; Hugh 
Wyndham (1877-1963), the shadow defence minister, and his wife, Maud 
(1880-1952); Captain H.W.M. Bamford, of the 1st SA Infantry Brigade; Lt 
Cyril Newton-Thompson, a young South African serving in the British 
Army; Captain William Lennox-Gordon, a medical officer with the South 
African General Hospital at Abbeville; and Sergeant-Major Alex Knox of 
the 1st South African Field Ambulance.  
The politics of participation: a ‘second little bit’ 
South Africa’s decision to enter the First World War and assist Britain in the 
struggle was not easy. Despite the propaganda regarding the Unification of 
South Africa (1910) and the supposed confluence of the ‘white’ sectors – 
English and Afrikaans – into a new South Africanism, South Africa was not 
a united country in 1914. There was no South African nation, no consensus 
on the war. Even the nomenclature differed. For English South Africans, 
following the British trend, it was the Great War.12 For the clerks in the 
South African defence department it was ‘the European Crisis’; for their 
counterparts in the prime minister’s office in 1914, it was ‘the German 
South West Expedition’, almost as if these two events could be separated.13 
For F.S. Malan, the education minister, it was, in August 1914, ‘die Brits-
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Duitse-oorlog’ (the Anglo-German War),14 a description supported by M.T. 
Steyn, the former Orange Free State president, who, writing to Smuts on 31 
July 1914, reckoned that ‘the troubles in England are the result of the South 
African War. One sees still more. This war has driven England out of her 
“splendid isolation” into her “ententes” and her yellow alliances and today 
she has fallen foul of Continental entanglements. The mills of Providence 
grind slowly indeed!’15 The Republican Boers had hoped for this in 1900. 
Now, fourteen years later, this happened and there was, to the mind of the 
Afrikaner nationalist, no reason whatever to help Britain. They might, as 
Steyn was suggesting, rather seize the moment offered by Providence. 
 1910 1915 
Party Seats  Votes Percent Seats  Vvotes Percent 
Labour 3 11549 10.9 4 25690 9.8 
Labour – GM    - 802 0.3 
Independent 12 19563 18.5 5 10911 4.2 
Independent Lab 1 815 0.8    
Independent SAP 1 3430 3.2    
Independent UP 2 ♦     
National Party    27 78184 29.9 
SAP 66 30052 28.4 54 93482 35.8 
Socialist  - 448 0.4    
Unionist 36 39766 37.6 40 48034 18.4 
Table 1: The position of parties in South Africa, The House of Assembly, 1910 and 
1915. 
♦  The Independent Unionists were uncontested in two seats in the Cape Province. 
(Source: B.M. Schoeman, Parlementêre verkiesings in Suid-Afrika, 33, 66-67.) 
Unsurprisingly therefore, Louis Botha, former Boer general and now 
wartime prime minister, battled to achieve and then maintain consensus in 
his cabinet. Faced with potential defections and the growing rift in 
Afrikanerdom, his first wartime ministry was unstable and his second 
ministry, formed after the October 1915 election, could only govern with 
Unionist support, though not in formal coalition (table 1). Nationally, Botha 
found himself between two camps: a ‘British’ sector, wanting to involve 
South Africa fully in the war, and an Afrikaner camp, wanting South Africa 
to remain neutral. The first considered it South Africa’s duty, as a loyal 
dominion of the empire, to freely support the British war effort. In fact, 
during the 1912 defence debate, the Unionists had predicted a time when 
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South Africa would not only have to assume responsibility for her own 
defence, but also offer the ‘old country’ the support of a South African 
expeditionary force.16 To Afrikaner nationalists this was anathema. Botha, 
perhaps naively, had hoped to unite the country behind the war effort, and so 
smear longer term bonds. This was, as Frans Malan noted, ‘wonderful 
politics’ and Botha succeeded to a surprising degree in quietening the voice 
of radical labour and nationalistic Africans. However, as Malan predicted, 
Botha, by committing South Africa to the war, would run ‘the danger of 
losing the sentiment of the [Afrikaner] people.’17 The war and the questions 
it opened fuelled Afrikaner nationalism. 
Furthermore, South Africa’s military task was complicated. The 
Union Defence Force was little more than two years old and South Africa, 
as Buchan reminds us, had ‘foes within and without her gates.’18 Her task, 
‘of all the nations of the British Commonwealth … [was] at the outbreak of 
war the most intricate.’19 Nonetheless, at the beginning of August 1914, 
South Africa duly offered to take care of her own defence, so freeing 
imperial troops for deployment to France. The defences of South Africa 
were now for the first time manned solely by the new UDF, some of whom, 
disliking the tedium of garrison duties and the manning of home defences, 
were anxious to form a South Africa expeditionary force. Failing this some 
left to join the British Army.20 
Just as the UDF was being organised for homeland defence, the 
monitoring of the Germans across the Orange and the maintenance of a 
strike force in the event of an African rising or industrial unrest, Britain 
asked South Africa to capture the wireless stations in neighbouring German 
South West Africa. After considerable deliberation in a divided cabinet, 
South Africa acquiesced on August 10.21 Although appreciating South 
Africa’s political and military difficulties, London pushed Pretoria toward 
an early expedition.22 However, broad-based public opinion stood in sharp 
contrast to the parliamentary division approving the war plans. Botha and 
Smuts, egged on by the English-speaking community, embraced the 
comfortable notion that their Afrikaner compatriots welcomed the 
opportunities for nation building and patriotism presented by the war with 
equal enthusiasm.23 Hugh Wyndham, a prominent Unionist and shadow 
defence minister, misreading the situation entirely, reported that ‘the feeling 
amongst the Boers out here is excellent’24; while his wife, a Lyttelton, was 
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sure that ‘the feeling can never go back to what it was before that’s 
certain.’25 Yet, far from nation-building and created some common 
‘feeling’, the war presented for what Bill Nasson has termed ‘the non-
loyalist strata of Afrikaner society’ unique opportunities for party-
politicking and their far-right hoped to seize the chance to restore a Boer 
republic.26 
Nonetheless, despite the Afrikaner Rebellion, sparked by the South 
African invasion of neighbouring German South West Africa, and 
increasing bitterness through 1915, Botha, refusing to accept a final break 
between himself and the Afrikaner far-right, continued to hope for 
rapprochement. This was made difficult by the Unionists, who, although the 
official opposition, were committed to an active war policy. Botha’s 
position was made more complicated by the general election that October, 
although unwisely he did not to keep the brigade in South Africa for the 
election. He could ill-afford to lose their votes.27 The Free State voted 
solidly for Hertzog and, still worse, what the English sector branded 
‘Hertzogism’ had spread to the other provinces and particularly to the 
Transvaal and the Cape, where Dr D.F. Malan led the nationalists and edited 
their Cape newspaper, De Burger. The electoral result, a severe 
disappointment to Botha, was such that he, most reluctantly, could only 
remain in office with the parliamentary support of the Unionists. Divisions 
were worse than ever. Moreover, the Unionists, although giving Botha a 
majority in the house, felt excluded from real government. They were 
drawn, in some degree, into wartime decision support and even military 
office, but there was no war government or government of national unity. 
Furthermore, the Nationalists would have no part in the war effort and on 
this matter they were joined at times by what remained of the Labour Party. 
Botha, like the official opposition, believed that good war news would 
solidify the country, undermine the belief in nationalist quarters that Britain 
was going to be defeated, and so build a larger measure of national unity. 
Wyndham noted that the Afrikaner, recognising potential post-war rewards, 
had ‘a healthy desire to be on the winning side.’28 
However, the Union Defence Force, the instrument that was to 
manufacture this loyalty to empire, was, like the Union of South Africa, a 
compromise between the determination of English-speakers to maintain the 
‘British connection’ and the desire of Afrikaner nationalists for a restoration 
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of Boer political and military traditions. Barely two years old and 
notwithstanding the initial blunders and mistakes, the UDF, thanks in no 
small measure to the ability and determination of Smuts, captured German 
South West Africa.29 
Raising and despatch of an infantry brigade 
The Germans surrendered the territory unconditionally on 9 July 1915 and 
during October, with the election over and his political position stabilised, 
Botha, urged on by the Unionists and ‘loyal’ Afrikaners, turned to the war 
once more. The pro-war elements were concerned that South Africa was not 
doing enough; Maud Wyndham, representative of this opinion, complained 
to her mother-in-law, that life in South Africa was ‘smug & comfortable 
almost as if there was no war.’30 South Africa exported steel and war-related 
materials to Britain, Russia, France, Italy and Japan, but Botha, aware that 
South Africa’s economic wellbeing was tied to the fortunes of the British 
Empire, felt obliged to do more than simply support the wider British war 
effort through South African trade and industry.31 
A new realism was now dawning. For the British sector, the early-war 
enthusiasm, experienced by many Afrikaners as ultra jingoistic, had gone; 
while many Afrikaners, of the disloyal type, came to accept that the war 
would not provide opportunity to address old grudges with Britain. 
Moreover, many South Africans, men like Newton-Thompson, having left 
to join the British armed forces, were already serving on the Western Front 
and there had been some talk of recruiting of men in South Africa for 
enlistment in the New Army.32 
At the end of June 1915, before the conclusion of the German South 
West campaign, Britain approached South Africa on the question of a South 
African expeditionary force for France. John Buchan, succumbing to South 
African nation-building and the sensing the need to boost the image of 
Botha and Smuts after 1918, credits them for initiating the proposal.33 But 
this immediately encountered difficulty, as South Africa was not prepared to 
discuss ‘the contingent question’ until the campaign in German South West 
Africa (GSWA) had been concluded. Moreover, with an impending election, 
it was inadvisable to call parliament.34 Going to parliament, before the 
conclusion of the campaign in German South West, to vote the money for a 
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campaign somewhere else, would raise ‘acute political controversies … with 
results which [Smuts forecast] might be most undesirable.’35 Lord Buxton, 
the governor-general, agreed and so Britain left the question. But, on 9 July 
1915, on the day of the surrender, Buxton was pushing his ministers again; 
‘now’, he wrote to Smuts, ‘that this affair [in GSWA] is over I suppose 
South Africa will break out in a new place – I wonder where?’36 
These questions – whether another expeditionary force would be 
raised and where it would serve – elicited mixed feelings. Merriman, for 
one, felt that South Africa had already made its great sacrifice, both in terms 
of money and the GSWA campaign.37 Moreover, this campaign had been 
fought to ensure the security of her own borders. The theatres now proposed 
for South African involvement – East Africa and France – were 
geographically distant and, creating further ambiguity, the South Africa 
Defence Act (No 13 of 1912) authorised only a deployment of the UDF in 
‘South Africa’ and for the immediate defence of the Union. For this reason, 
volunteers could only be deployed further afield. However, from September 
1914, many South Africans had left for Europe to enlist as individuals in the 
British Army and, following Franke’s surrender, more were expected to 
leave. It seemed a pity that these men, willing to serve in Europe, were not 
fighting as South Africans. Moreover, as Graaff acknowledged, the 
government was under increasing pressure and they would have to do 
something ‘to meet the demands of those who are anxious to see a 
contingent depart.’ In fact, Pretoria, recognising that the conclusion of the 
South West campaign would produce a large number of unemployed men, 
was quite happy ‘to have [these men] at the front than on our hands.’38 For 
these reasons, the cabinet decided to send another contingent. But where 
was this ‘second little bit’ to be sent? 
Two theatres were proposed. The first was the main battleground in 
France, where the other dominions were already well-represented. The other 
was East Africa. The latter, supposedly ‘more in our line’ than a European 
campaign, was supported by a wide number of Britons and South Africans. 
A small contingent in France would not only be ‘swallowed up in the 
enormous armies’ and lose their identity, but, as Graaff noted to Smuts, 
South Africans had neither the training nor the campaign experience to fit 
them for the Western Front; whereas in Tanganyika, South Africa would 
have her own ‘show’ once again and South African troops ‘could fight in 
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their own way.’39 Smuts liked the idea of Tanganyika too. He agreed with 
the military arguments, the promise of mobility, South Africa’s strong suite, 
in which mounted infantry could play a role, but recognised also that, if 
South Africa conquered the territory, some sort of exchange with 
Mozambique might consolidate territories south of the Zambezi and Kunene 
rivers.40 
However, Britain had requested specifically an infantry contingent and 
for the Somme theatre of operations and, when Pretoria responded to 
London’s call, they expressed their ‘readiness to render all the assistance in 
their power in prosecuting the war in Europe and elsewhere.’41 In doing so, 
Pretoria hoped to satisfy the British request as well as their own sub-
imperial goals. In pursuance of this dual policy, Pretoria agreed to send a 
contingent to Europe, which would be composed of the volunteers they 
expected in large numbers, perhaps sufficient to form a second and even a 
third brigade.42 In fact, with the campaign in GSWA at end, Smuts was 
confident that South Africa would be able to raise three infantry brigades 
and then they might even consider forming a South African division.43 
However, Smuts was to be disappointed. The recruitment drive 
opened on 21 July 1915, in time to draw the troops returning victorious from 
German South West.44 A call was made both for heavy artillery as well as 
infantry,45 although the War Office had asked specifically for infantry. As 
expected, there was a flurry of interest, particularly from inhabitants of 
British blood.46 Men rushed again to the colours. Some, like Louis Matthews, 
writing once the brigade had been formed, was ‘afraid of being left in the 
cold.’47 However, in view of the small white population and the complexity 
of South Africa’s other tasks, including the pending deployment to 
Tanganyika, it was agreed that South Africa could not raise and maintain in 
France much more than a brigade. Buchan has suggested that Botha, not 
wanting to ‘denude the country of too many of her most loyal and vigilant 
citizens’, could in fact send no more than a brigade of infantry to Europe.48 
On August 10, 1915, Botha informed Buxton that the South African 
contingent would comprise one infantry brigade, one signalling company, 
one field ambulance and one general hospital, in addition to five batteries of 
heavy artillery and some, if not the whole, of the personnel for five four-gun 
batteries (13-pounder quick-firing) of field artillery and some aviation 
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personnel, together with aeroplanes and accessories.49 Botha, however, 
noted rather ominously that reinforcement ‘may prove difficult.’50 
The force was established in accordance with the war establishments 
fixed for the New Armies51 and the British government assumed liability for 
pay – an issue soon to have political consequences.52 The four battalions, 
brigaded as the 1st South African Infantry Brigade, were, as indicated in table 2, 
‘designed to represent the main divisions of the Union, and recruits were given 
the option of joining the regiment affiliated to their own province.’53 This 
formed part of a difficult, but broad-fronted attempt to gain language equity 
and balance sectarian interests. As it transpired, the two main military 
efforts were to be East Africa and France, where Smuts, himself, and Brig 
Gen H.T. (Tim) Lukin were to command respectively, the former 
representing the Afrikaans sector, the latter the English. Moreover, with 
only about 15 percent of the original brigade being Afrikaans, the bulk of 
the contingent that went to France was English, although by the end of the 
war, the proportion of Afrikaners had increased to about 30 percent.54 
Buchan has suggested that Afrikaners, renown as mounted riflemen and 
having enhanced this reputation in GSWA, were not attracted to British-
style infantry and so they were by preference destined for Tanganyika.55 
Regiment Source Commander 
1st SA Infantry Cape Province Lt Col F.S. Dawson  
(4th SAMR) 
2nd SA Infantry Natal and the Orange 
Free State 
Lt Col W.E.C. Tanner  
(District Staff Officer, 
Pietermaritzburg) 
3rd SA Infantry Transvaal and Rhodesia Lt Col E.F. Thackeray 
(District Staff Officer, 
Kimberley) 
4th SA Infantry South African Scottish Lt Col F.A. Jones 
(District Staff Officer, 
Johannesburg) 
Table 2: The battalions represented the main political divisions in South 
Africa. 
However, in truth, the military experience of those leaving the Union 
was quite irrelevant to the tasks at hand, both in Tanganyika and France. The 
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Union Defence Force, although established in July 1912 and still in embryo 
when the war broke out, was not inexperienced. But, this experience was all 
South African, and, almost exclusively of the small-war variety. Moreover, the 
UDF was a rather difficult marriage of four disparate forces, representing at 
least three military traditions and speaking two languages. Sectarian interest 
was very strong and this did not facilitate organisational design and effective 
command.56 And, to complicate matters further, there was little cooperation 
after August 1914 between the South African defence department and the 
local British military authorities, something that irritated Major-General 
C.W. Thompson, the commander of the South African (Imperial) Military 
Command. Over the following years, relations between the Castle and 
Defence Headquarters in Pretoria declined, reaching in a nadir in 1917 with 
the recall of Thompson’s successor, Brigadier-General A.E.J. Cavendish.57 
Members of the public, sensing perhaps the deterioration in local 
Anglo-South African relations, wondered how the South African 
commanders, many of them former Boer generals, would perform out of 
their own country. The campaigns were thought, quite correctly, to be very 
different to fighting in the Transvaal, which they knew intimately and where 
their operations had always been defensive. But the former Boer generals 
were not the sole focus of criticism. Carter, the Anglican prelate, doubted 
whether the South Africans, as a group, regardless of language, would be a 
‘match for professional German officers.’58 Others repeated this view in 
letters to the press.59 Many had little faith in the South African high 
command.60 
The 1st South African Infantry Brigade, comprising four infantry 
battalions, was placed under the command of Brigadier-General Tim Lukin, 
a seasoned campaigner in South Africa since the time of the Anglo-Zulu 
War (1879). Both Botha and Smuts had had their doubts about Lukin, which 
they raised during the GSWA campaign.61 They thought him ill-suited to a 
mobile role and perhaps too wedded to the British way of things. Lacking 
the necessary African zest, they thought him better suited to warfare in 
Europe. Moreover, rumours had surfaced that Smuts might be offered 
command in Tanganyika, in which case a general officer representing the 
‘English’ interest would be good. They could dispatch Lukin to France and, 
at the same time, satisfy English-South African opinion. Douglas Haig, who 
encountered Lukin during the Anglo-Boer War, thought him a commander 
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of ‘great ability’ and, in 1918, declared that he viewed him as ‘one of the 
most reliable Divisional Commanders in France.’62 
Of the battalion commanders, only one was South African born (Tanner); 
but all, like Lukin, had had small war experience. Dawson spent some time as a 
planter in British Honduras before 1899; while Thackeray, at about the same 
time, had had an intermezzo as a cowboy in the United States. All saw service 
in South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War and Dawson, born in Sussex, and 
Thackeray, in Middlesex, entered the South African structures through the 
South African Constabulary. All saw service in German South West Africa, 
Jones having been brigade major in the 1st Infantry Brigade.63 
The South African Contingent and deployment in Western Europe 
The brigade was recruited and mobilised in Potchefstroom in August and 
September 1915 and, although destined for Britain for further training, was 
rerouted to Egypt, where, in daring moves across the desert, they brought on 
the defeat of the Sanussi. This diversion away from Europe, albeit 
temporary, concerned some in South Africa. Maud Wyndham, believing that 
the tide in Europe was turning, hoped that the Brigade would still reach 
France ‘for the last lap, & march on Berlin.’64 As the elements of the South 
African expeditionary force approached the Western Front, the South 
African parliament was prorogued after a session, described by her husband, 
the shadow defence minister, as most unwarlike.65 Miners’ phthisis and the 
university question seemed very South African, narrow and unimportant 
against the backdrop of a world war and the vital imperial issues with which 
the conflict was associated.66 Moreover, the political and military situation 
had not improved. Amidst Nationalist rhetoric and rumours of another 
rebellion, silence from German East Africa seemed ominous. If the 
campaign seemed to be stalling there, at least the news from France was 
more encouraging and, with the arrival of the South African expeditionary 
force, eyes in South Africa were firmly fixed on the Western Front.67 
The 1st South African Infantry Brigade arrived in Marseilles from 20 
April 1916 and trained via Lyons to Versailles and then on to Abbeville.68 
They arrived at Hazebrouck on 23 April where, for the first time, they 
experienced the artillery and aircraft activity then characteristic of the 
Western front.69 Over the next days the regiments were kitted out (they 
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found that ‘the gas helmets already in possession’ were ‘the wrong pattern 
& unserviceable’). Much training was done and specifically in bayonet and 
trench fighting, bombing, attacking from trenches and ‘moving up over 
ground swept by long range artillery fire to reinforce our own front line.’70 
The Brigade, having moved to Le Bizet, was strafed for the first time on 20 
May and shelled repeatedly during the following days,71 experiencing their 
first 8-inch shell fire on 23 May.72 The Brigade moved, ‘often a very trying 
journey through the mud’, to Grovetown Valley on 30 June.73 
Two medical outfits accompanied the brigade:  a field ambulance and 
a general hospital.74 The 1st SA Field Ambulance moved to France in April 
1916, following the conclusion of the Sanussi campaign in Egypt. The 
ambulance comprised three sections each with three medical officers and 60 
other ranks: A Section was the headquarters unit under the unit commander; 
while B and C sections were each under the command of a major. The 
sections were divided into tent and bearer subsections or divisions. The 
bearer divisions were placed with the brigade, while the tent divisions were 
grouped into a dressing station for wounded able to march the approximate 
six kilometres from the front line; a main dressing station (at the divisional 
headquarters) some 15 kilometres from the front line; and a corps rest area, 
some 22 kilometres from the front, where recuperating patients and the war-
weary were taken up for final recovery. During the first phase of the battle 
of the Somme this was at Chateau Corbie. Medivac was in the form of a 
chain; wounded able to march and bearer casualties were taken by 
regimental bearers (responsible for field dressing) to the regimental medical 
post. Wounded able to march were taken from here to the dressing stations 
where they were further cared for by the staff of the Field Ambulance. 
Serious casualties were conveyed to 1st SA General Hospital, by either car 
or barge.75 
The South African General Hospital had a staff of 21 officers, two 
warrant officers, 43 nursing sisters and 142 other ranks; of whom Major 
William Lennox Gordon and Sergeant-Major Alex Knox have left small but 
rich collections of private papers.76 Knox, on arriving at Le Havre, noted 
what he termed ‘several quaint customs of [the] French’ – ‘Traffic on right 
of road, open sanitary conveniences, dirty aspect of town, absence of proper 
drainage systems.’77 At the rest camp, they were accommodated in ‘Bell 
tents on boards with only one blanket.’78 Abbeville, as Knox diarised, was 
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an important railhead and the advanced base on the lines of communication 
in the Somme valley. It was also a quaint town with a ‘nice old abbey which 
shewed marks of bombardment of war of 1570/1571 still on walls.’ The 
hospital was ‘camped on [a] site adjoining No 2 Stationary Hospital just 
outside town itself on Doullens-Amiens Road to Arras. Hospital very much 
worked since rush of July 1st.’79 The Ambulance was stationed there, 
temporarily only, Knox thought, to relive pressure on No 2 Stationary 
Hospital, on a ‘very small piece of ground pitched up against large cornfield 
no chance of expansion.’ Temporary buildings were erected for the 
operating theatre and kitchens, everything else in tents.80 The personnel 
underwent training on the nature of static warfare and the handling of 
casualties exposed to gas and braced themselves for the impending flood of 
patients that would follow the offensive.81 
A considerable number of the artillerymen, serving with the five South 
African heavy batteries, had served in German South West. They mobilised 
for France as the 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th and 75th Siege Batteries, R.G.A. In 
April 1916, a sixth battery, the 125th, was formed; while, early in 1918, two 
further batteries, the 542nd and the 496th, were formed, but, when they 
arrived on the Western Front, they were broken up and their guns and 
personnel distributed among the other South African batteries. Also in 1918, 
the South African batteries were brought together and two South African 
brigades of heavy artillery were formed.82 However, as the historian of 72nd 
Siege Battery noted, despite a ‘wonderful keenness’ displayed by all ranks, 
their ‘training facilities were not of the best, for the guns at the disposal of 
the batteries were by no means up to date and new methods of warfare, 
suitable to the changed conditions on the Western front, were constantly 
being brought out.’ Moreover, on arrival in Britain, it was announced that 
the batteries would be siege batteries, armed with six-inch howitzers, ‘a new 
weapon then under construction’, and affiliated to the Royal Garrison 
Artillery.83 This, Ernest Lane, one of the officers, thought a mistake: 
‘The greatest asset a South African has is his mobility and power to trek 
around, and they should have given us animal traction guns which are easier to 
learn how to handle, and then sent us off to some of the more distant and 
warmer scenes of war, whereas now we are siege artillery, tractor-drawn, with 
guns 96-inch howitzers that require the highest technical knowledge, and are 
likely to get to Flanders, where all the men will get horribly tucked up with 
cold.’84 
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However, despite such gloomy forecasts, the batteries not only 
performed well, but enjoyed a life far more pleasant than that experienced 
by the brigade. The 73rd Siege Battery, for example, was, in July 1916, 
‘comfortably billeted in farm buildings, while the guns were sited for 
camouflage purposes under fruit trees in an orchard’ and ‘at this time the 
surrounding country and village behind the lines showed little signs of war.’ 
The battery’s historian records that ‘everything was fresh & green’, a 
countryside that was beautiful and to be enjoyed, ‘and the general consensus 
of opinion throughout the Battery was that the war – to quote the popular 
expression – was “a good war”.’85 For the staff of the South African General 
Hospital, which moved to a location near Abbeville in mid-July, this was 
equally so.86 However, as the 73rd’s historian noted, ‘conditions gradually 
became harder.’87 
The much-expected, great offensive commenced in the Somme sector 
on July 1. The South Africans all along the British sector of the line, 
witnessed something of the opening of the offensive, and were eager 
recipients of early news passed back from the immediate front by own 
forces as well as captured Germans.88 Before midday on July 1, the first 
prisoners arrived in batches of fifty in Grovetown Valley. One prisoner told 
Bamford that the attack had been expected for the past four days. Their 
officers had told them that the Scottish divisions of the British Army were in 
front of them and that these divisions ‘took no prisoners.’ As a consequence, 
they had had no sleep for four days and nights!89 The massive 
bombardments, according to Bamford, were ‘as intense an artillery 
bombardment as has ever been heard during the whole war on any front.’90 
And, with ‘dead Bosches [Germans] … lying everywhere in their trenches 
& the ground beyond’, the news was ‘extremely good’ and the South 
Africans were, Bamford records, ‘anxious to be sent forward.’91 Forming 
part of the corps reserve, they were eager to be in the thick of the action. 
Back in South Africa, a news-hungry public, aware that the great offensive 
had commenced, eagerly awaited the first reports.92  
With the Allies attacking on all fronts, and the Russian advance 
supposedly going ‘on and on like a song from Boris Gudonov’93, Germany’s 
defeat now seemed inevitable. Now, at last, the South Africans were doing 
something or were about to do something, and as part of an attack that, it 
seemed, would not ‘fizzle out in a week.’94 Moreover, the first newspaper 
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reports, listing Allied successes, had an immediate effect in South Africa. 
Even De Burger broadcast South African success. The South African 
contingent it proclaimed capture Delville Wood, ‘een van de belangrijkste 
centra is van de vijand in deze streek.’ Moreover, noting the casualties, De 
Burger praised the troops:  
‘de manschappen zich van hun taak hadden gekweten op een wijze, waarover 
Zuid-Afrika inderdaad trots kan zijn. Toen het ogenblik aanbrak, dat zij over de 
verschansingen heen moesten springen en de zone binnengaan, welke door de 
machinegeweren bestreken werd, was er met een die aarzelde. Er had slechts 
weinig handeschudden plaats voor de sprong, en toen weergalmde de 
zuidafrikaanse oorlogskreet. Enige minute later worstelden zij met de Hunnen 
op leven en dood, gebruik makende van de bajonet, de kolf en de sable, maar 
zij gingen vooruit over duitse lijken heen, over gebroken versperrigen, 
slagijzers en zo voort. … roemrijke aandeel …’ 95  
The good war news bolstered British prestige and that of the Botha 
government, and so quietened Boer dissatisfaction. Hertzog even published a 
letter in the press, calling for restraint among the extremists in his party. Other 
Nationalist leaders followed suite, expressing their intention of adhering to 
constitutional means in addressing grievances.96 English South Africans 
believed that nationalists around the empire were more careful and as a 
consequence of the fate of Irish nationalists in the wake of the Easter Rising. 
Yet, Maud Wyndham felt it ‘so different being away from it all.’97 She wanted 
to be in the midst of events, nursing soldiers in France or doing war work in 
London, where she could hear ‘everything rather than being in [South Africa] 
missing things, even croaks & grumbles [which] I suppose go on all the time 
even now when the news is so good – or at any rate veering slowly but surely in 
our favour.’98 Nonetheless, through July 1916, she thought the war news 
cheering, ‘as progress really seems steady on our side all round.’ It made a great 
difference to read the papers then. Formerly the allies ‘were forever “retreating 
to straighten our line” or to “consolidate our position”.’99 Not for a moment 
doubting Germany’s eventual defeat, Mrs Wyndham dreaded ‘all the 
unhappiness every hour’ brought.100 However, no matter how terrible, she 
felt that at least they now had something ‘to show for [the losses].’101 
By 8 July the Brigade was in the trenches on the edge of Bernafray 
Woods and over the ensuing days, during the battles for Bernafray Woods 
and Trones Woods and then Longueval and Delville Wood, casualties 
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increased to the extent that the planned pattern of medical evacuation 
disintegrated. The casualties were numerous and the task of the bearers, 
having to carry wounded to the forward dressing station at Bernafray Wood, 
while also pummelled by the war, was enormous. SSgt Walsh, of the bearer 
section, collected a DCM. The movement of casualties from the dressing 
stations to the hospital was also no easy task; patients were despatched by 
train, motor vehicle and, for the most serious cases, by barge on the 
Somme.102 
Battalion Total 14 
Jul 
15 
Jul 
16 
Jul 
17 
Jul 
18 
Jul 
19 
Jul 
20 
Jul 
1st SAI 192 13 2 27 26 114 5 5 
2nd SAI 177 3 35 14 21 82 19 3 
3rd SAI 145 1 29 33 20 32 17 13 
4th SAI 156 1 28 40 27 32 25 3 
Totals 670 18 94 114 94 260 66 24 
Percent 100% 3 14 17 14 39 10 3 
Table 3: The killed and missing of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade, 
14-20 July 1916. 
(Source: I. Uys, Rollcall; The Delville Wood Story, p 195.) 
 
Table 3 shows that thirty-nine percent of the casualties occurred on a 
single day, July 18, when, due to the arrival of large convoys of wounded, 
No 2 Stationary Hospital became more of a clearing station.103 Over the 
following days, as the casualties among the South African Infantry and 
South African Field Artillery increased, life at the South African hospital at 
Abbeville became more hectic. The hospital, now receptacle for overflow 
from the nearby British hospital as well as cases that arrived directly, faced 
several difficulties. The first of these was dealing with the British hospital 
system and, the second, the weather. Having just taken up 243 new cases on 
July 24, Knox records: 
‘Unsatisfactory methods by which these people kept their books made it 
extremely difficult at first to find out where we were. Everything in state of 
chaos. Temporary tents and operating theatres fixed up. Everything made 
exceedingly difficult and unpleasant by appearance of drizzling rain which left 
everything in about 3 inches of mud.’104 
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 Incoming 
sick 
Incoming 
wounded 
Surgery 
performed 
Further 
evacuation 
Number 
of deaths 
daily 
23 July     118  
24 July 140 103    
25 July  --------- 54 ---------  118  
26 July       
27 July   43   10 
28 July  10 53 57 • 143  
Table 4: Through flow of patients at the South African General Hospital, 
Abbeville, July 1916 
•  Among these were many amputations resulting from gas gangrene due to 
corrosive shell and gas shell. 
(Sources: Diary, July 1916, NASAP: A164 Sergeant Major Alex J. Knox 
Collection.) 
Knox was ‘fed up with [the] unsatisfactory way patients were left to 
the mercy of a willing and efficient but ill-equipped staff.’105 The nature of 
the cases presented a third range of challenges. On July 24 the South 
African hospital lost two patients from gas gangrene following gunshot 
wounds, all ‘fearful wounds’ Knox thought.106 These varied from serious 
bullet and shell wounds to gassing and shell shock.107 The following day 
was ‘absolute hell.’ The medical officers were pushed to the limit in the 
operating tents, the orderlies in the wards, and the bearer division, under 
Major Pringle, worked to the limit conveying casualties to the field 
ambulance and on to the hospital.108 Knox, an administration sergeant-
major, spent a few hours on some days in the theatre when not engaged in 
the evacuation of patients to England and elsewhere. His diary gives an 
impression of the work of the hospital, although accurate data cannot be 
compiled from it. Nonetheless, with 243 new patients on 24 July and the 
evacuation of 118 on 23 July and the same number two days later, this must 
have been frenzied (table 4). 
The medical officers and orderlies were perhaps the first to hear of the 
‘terrible suffering of the Brigade in the Wood. Roll call only revealed 80 of 
each regiment, percentage of officers killed very large.’109 As shown in table 
5, all of the officers of the 2nd and 3rd regiments became casualties, a record, 
Buchan noted, that equalled that of the 1st Coldstream and the 2nd Royal 
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Scots Fusiliers at First Ypres.110 When Gordon paid a visit to the 1st 
Regiment on August 16, 1916, he found few of the friends he had made 
earlier in Egypt and France: 
‘There were not many of the men I knew. Most of the officers have been 
wounded. English & Tempany have both commissions. Tempany is wounded 
& English is away. Brown was killed, he had his commission for only a few 
minutes as he got it in the field.’111 
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1st SAI 31 748 8 213 23 535 74% 71.5% 
2nd SAI 26 669 2 ♦ 185 26 484 100% 72% 
3rd SAI 29 847 1 104 28 743 96.5% 88% 
4th SAI 27 672 7 183 20 489 74% 73% 
M.G. Coy 8 96 - 17 8 79 100% 82% 
Totals 121 3032 18 702 105 2330 87.5% 77% 
Table 5: South African casualties in Longueval and Delville Wood, 14 – 20 
July 1916: fighting strength less all detached men 
♦  These two officers were wounded but returned to duty. 
Note: A considerable number of officers and other ranks, who were slightly 
wounded in Bernafray Wood and the trenches between Maricourt and 
Montauban, returned to duty within a few days and were killed or wounded 
in the later fighting. These Lukin only showed once as casualties. 
(Source: Schedule B to Despatch No III by Brig Gen H.T. Lukin, 14 Aug 
1916, SANDF Documentation Centre: WO1DA, box 5, South African 
Infantry Brigade Headquarters, July 1916, Operations on the Somme.) 
 
The 1st SA Infantry Brigade and its field ambulance were withdrawn 
from the Longueval sector of the Somme front on July 20. The nature of the 
war on the Western Front, static and including the shifting of military units 
up and down the front and into reserve and back again makes the South 
African deployment in France seem complicated. The artillery batteries 
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were also withdrawn at times, only to be moved back into the line, 
sometimes to the same place, a few days or a few weeks later. However, two 
events loom large in the South African experience of the Somme campaign, 
marked purely by the intensity of the experience and the scale of the human 
losses. They are Delville Wood, where, between July 1 and July 20, the 
South Africans suffered 3 155 casualties, and the Butte de Warlincourt, 
where, that October, a further 1150 losses were sustained by the infantry 
brigade (table 6).  
 Delville Wood  
1–20 July 1916 
Butte de Warlincourt 
9-19 Oct 1916 
Killed  457  
Death assumed 186  
Died of wounds 120  
Wounded  1476  
Prisoners  297  
Total Casualties  3155 1150 
Table 6: South African Infantry Brigade casualties: the two most expensive 
months. 
 
The heavy casualties sustained by the Brigade during July made the 
resumption of the recruitment of reinforcements a ‘most pressing 
necessity.’112 In fact, on 4 July 1916, before the Brigade entered the 
frontline, the Army Council had raised the matter of recruiting to fill the 
coming losses. A monthly intake of 10% of establishment was suggested.113 
Botha postponed his answer. He left for German East Africa on July 11 to 
consult with Smuts.114 By early August, he had still not replied. London 
probed Pretoria again.115 Bourne, the civilian head of the defence 
department, doubted whether they would be able to recruit much more than 
Smuts’ requirements for East Africa. However, recognising that the situation 
regarding the Brigade, owing to the very heavy casualties, was grave, 
Bourne suggested that they would soon know whether the East Africa 
campaign was likely be prolonged and, if so, on Botha’s return, they would 
make a special recruiting effort, which, if successful, might even produce 
some 500 to 1000 recruits for France, in addition to meeting the need for 
troops in Tanganyika.116 
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Yet Botha, persistently unrealistic, hoped still to supply a complete 
division with reserves for France. An early end to the Tanganyika campaign 
would release men for Europe. Buxton, however, shared Bourne’s caution. 
The governor-general warned Botha that, if South Africa was to field a 
division, he would need, in addition to the brigade already in France, a 
further twenty-eight thousand recruits over the next six months. 
Furthermore, as Buxton noted, mounted troops, even with rebellion and 
German West and East Africa experience, would not be of much use in 
France. A South African Infantry Division was, therefore, out of the 
question and all that could be done to increase South African visibility in 
France was to brigade the multifarious South African units together in the 
same division.117 
Botha returned from Tanganyika knowing that the campaign there was 
not at an end. He knew too that there was ‘no reasonable prospect of 
reopening recruiting for the 1st South African Infantry brigade with any 
chance of success, and at the same time of keeping pace with the 
requirements of Union Imperial Service Infantry Units in East Africa for 
reinforcements to replace wastage.’118 He faced two choices. Firstly, await a 
successful conclusion to the campaign in Tanganyika before reopening the 
recruitment drives and then raise the additional units allowing the formation 
of a complete South African Division.119 Or, secondly, recruit concurrently 
for both Smuts and Lukin. Botha, wanting to cover both his sub-imperial 
and prestige objectives, opted for the second. 
Two recruiting campaigns started on September 1. However, amidst 
the outcry over pay120 and complaints regarding the irregularity of supply in 
Tanganyika, far fewer recruits than were expected came forward. Since 
Botha’s appeal on August 17, 2084 recruits were obtained, but only 146 for 
the Brigade in France. This fell far short of the draft of 600, which was the 
minimum requirement. Yet, the Union cabinet thought the general result of 
the appeal neither unsatisfactory nor surprising. The recruits had gravitated 
to East Africa for two reasons: they ‘felt that the first call on them was for 
the arduous campaign close to their gates’ and the fact that East Africa 
offered a better rate of pay. Although recruitment for the brigade in France 
was of the utmost importance, only 100 infantry left for Europe that 
October. The ministers requested the Army Council to ‘understand the 
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position’ and the ‘difficult circumstances’ under which these arrangements 
were made.121  
By September the offensive on the Somme had clearly petered out. 
This and the mixed reports from German East Africa, where the progress 
was slow and the complaints many, did much to undermine Botha’s position 
in South Africa. The failure of the recruitment drives was a symptom of this. 
To return to the question posed by Lt Cyril Newton-Thompson on 7 July 
1916, was ‘the game worth the candle.’122 The men sent abroad seemed to 
be paying a tremendous price, exposed either to the malarial jungles and 
rigours of East Africa or the trenches and brutalisation of industrial warfare 
in France. 
The Legacies of the Western Front 
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UK  22      
Canada 628,964 14 458,218 73 56,639 9 12 
Australia 412,953 14 331,814 80 59,330 14 18 
NZ 128,525 20 112,223 87 16,711 13 15 
S. Africa 136,070 10 ♦ 76,184 56 7,121 5 9 
India 683,149  1,096,013  65,056   
Table 7: The contribution of imperial and dominion troops to the war effort, 
1914-1918 
♦  This figure is a percentage of the white male population. 
(Source: adapted from A.S. Thompson, Imperial Britain, p 158.) 
 
For the allied powers, the ostensible victors, victory was bittersweet. For South 
Africa, this was little different. Although South Africa emerged physically 
unscathed, the price tag, in money and sacrifice, had been high.123 Although 
South African casualties were comparatively low, when compared with the 
other dominions (table 7), most of the 7121 killed had died on the Western 
Front. For South Africa, a country accustomed to limited wars and low own-
force casualties, these losses were unacceptable. Furthermore, the war, 
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together with the rebellion and rumour of rebellion, had come at a political cost, 
increasing as it did popular suspicion of government, leaders, and institutions 
like the military. It discredited Botha and Smuts, the wartime ministers, and, 
although temporarily aligning South Africa with the allied powers, estranged 
Smuts and those of broader vision from the mass of Afrikaners. 
Coming to terms with the carnage 
This was, of course, not a phenomenon uniquely South African. Generals, 
across the board, were blamed for the costly failures of the war. Military 
commanders on all sides were criticised and quite severely, for the apparent 
waste of human life in a succession of offensives that gained little, while 
they, it would said, were safe, back at their HQ’s enjoying the best France 
could offer. Many South Africans saw Delville Wood as an example of this 
callousness. Maud Wyndham went a step further and blamed the Allied 
generals for these military ‘muddles’ and accused many of them of being 
incompetent and lacking in the mental ability needed to effect a 
breakthrough. She was even more critical towards the political leaders, who 
she accused of not supporting the generals at the front with a workable and 
realistic grand strategy to win the war. ‘Providence’, she lamented, ‘has not 
given us a Chatham and a Marlborough to guide us thro this period.’124 
Yet, although it was ‘no use girding against the poor minnows we 
have got’, Mrs Wyndham was convinced, as many South Africans were, that 
‘there [were] things even a minnow might avoid.’125 The South African 
leadership, although praised in Britain for their stance, was at times, for both 
the British sector in South Africa as well as the Afrikaner right, an object for 
amusement or of scorn. Furthermore, the politicians were blamed for not 
facilitating a solution to the deadlock. The politicians, Newton-Thompson 
complained, were ‘prepared to fight to the last drop of blood of the soldiers at 
the front.’126 And they did not seem to have any answers to the problems, 
answers which soldiers at the front seemed to have had. To quote Newton-
Thompson, who admitted he did ‘not know enough about the interdependence 
of the German armies to know what effect our attack at the Somme has in 
helping the attack of our allies in other parts’: 
‘The Allies must realize that if they are going to win this war (i.e. hands down) 
they must have roughly 3 men in the field to every two which the Germans & 
Austrians have & they must have 3 guns to every two German guns; and we must 
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count 3 Italians as one man in reckoning our strength. If we settle down to this we 
shall win in the end. The hordes of Russia must be marshalled & discipline; the 
wavering Italians must be exhorted to action, & the drooping spirits of the French 
must be revived; above all John Bull must plunge deeper & deeper into debt & 
must be prepared to get over another million of his stoutest sons killed & wounded 
in battle. Are we prepared to do all this? I wonder.’127 
Politicians seemed the true enemy of the soldier, whose collective 
innocence and sacrifice was memorialised on plinth and in churches as almost 
Christ-like. Emily Hobhouse, writing in August 1914, blamed the politicians, 
‘who make troubles’, for callously sending the troops in to be killed.128 N.W. 
Nichol, vocalising a popular sentiment three years later, reckoned that ‘there 
is no doubt the politicians ought to get it in the neck, it’s an awful shame 
that the soldiers should be the only ones to suffer.’129 They had been 
exposed to the brutality of warfare in Europe, without, it was thought, proper 
leadership, and without proper training. Colonial volunteers ought not to have 
been thrown into the line against German professional militarism.  
In the very different climate of the mid-1920s, the debate over the war 
that had not fully taken place at the war’s end assumed a central place in the 
larger and at times quite vocal debate over South African foreign policy. 
The basic issues remained. Firstly, there was the question of the morality of 
the intervention. Ought South Africa to involve herself in foreign, imperial 
wars? And, closely associated with this, was the aversion for technological 
warfare, for the materielschacht.130 Smuts himself wrote: 
‘There is much to make us profoundly sad and almost to despair of the future of the 
race when we see our greatest intellectual and scientific discoveries turned like so 
many daggers at the heart of civilization.’131 
The individual had to be recovered and returned to the centre stage; 
something it seemed could be done more easily in Africa, where human skill 
seemed to count for more. This raises the second matter, the wisdom of the 
intervention. Europe, simply stated, was not the place for South African 
military intervention. Warfare in Europe had to be avoided and, as a result, 
after 1924, the Union Defence Force refocused on Africa, where asymmetry 
would be to her advantage and was more suited to the South African way of 
war. The Somme had been geographically foreign, and its circumstances 
militarily unfamiliar.132 
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The military ‘lessons’ 
South Africa too went through several processes to deduce so-called 
‘lessons.’ The first of these was conducted under Lukin and at the behest of 
the commander of the 9th Division: 
‘The Division has done well in the recent fighting. We must now, while our 
several experiences are fresh in our memories, dig out and clarify by close 
discussion the lessons of the fighting so that we may do even better in the 
future.’  
Furse called for frankness and an inclusive process, based not on ‘fault 
finding’ but ‘fact finding’, so that ‘the best way of dealing with similar 
situations in the future’ could be discovered.133 A list of ‘subjects for 
enquiry’ was distributed and the South African report addressing numerous 
tactical matters, probably written by James Mitchell-Baker, the Brigade 
Major, was submitted by Lukin on 3 August 1916.134 
Several military publications were produced in South Africa between the 
two world wars. These included several drill manuals and textbooks135 as well 
as the official history of the Great War, which appeared in 1924. The last, 
described by Agar-Hamilton decades later as having ‘no outstanding merit’,136 
was a overall, macro history and was a tremendous disappointment to Major-
General Jack Collyer, a wartime chief of the general staff, who had hoped for a 
utilitarian history that would draw lessons and make instruction material for 
officers at the South African Military College.137 In view of this, Collyer, who 
was incidentally Lukin’s brother-in-law, bridged the gap himself with two 
textbooks, one on the German South West Africa campaign (1937) and another 
on the German East African campaign (1939). 
As far as Collyer was concerned European textbooks were irrelevant in 
Africa and he set about producing standard texts for warfare in Africa, deducing 
the ‘lessons’ in the nineteenth-century utilitarian, didactic fashion, neatly set-
out for the instruction of officers at the South African Military College.138 
Although, many of his ‘lessons’ were misinformed, they provide a rare insight 
into inter-war South African military thinking. Collyer, thought by some to be 
‘the Liddell-Hart of South Africa’139, pointed out and quite rightly that South 
Africa had not been prepared for war in 1914 and his first call was for the 
systematic collection and updating of information in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
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‘the teaching of experience’, emphasising both the importance of military 
history and the collection of accurate military information. Foreknowledge 
would lessen the difficulty in gaining strategic surprise, shorten campaigning in 
tropical Africa, and so limit casualties. However, Collyer, a mounted 
infantryman with fifty years of service in Africa, was clearly not a man for 
modern devices. He highlighted the problems of air power rather than 
possibilities140 and discounted the immediate value of mechanised transport in 
Africa, only mounted troops could be relied upon, and so provided unwittingly 
a theoretical basis for the ‘bush cart’ policy of Oswald Pirow, who became 
defence minister in 1933.141 The type of operations undertaken by South Africa 
in East Africa in 1940 and North Africa in 1941 had simply not been 
contemplated. 
South Africa and the neutrality question 
Nowhere was the impact of the Western Front for South Africa greater than 
on the nation’s foreign policy. The war shattered any possibility for post-
rebellion, national reconciliation and left South Africans confused and 
deeply divided on the goals to be pursued and methods used. Even before it 
had ended, the traumatic experience of the war, combined with the apparent 
improvement of relations between Afrikaners and some English-South 
Africans, and a growing preoccupation with domestic problems, produced a 
drastic reordering of national priorities. Smuts had placed foreign policy 
consistently near the top of the ranking of national concerns, but by 
Hertzog’s first term it was placed well down on the list.  
The National party, while in opposition, equated military and industrial 
power with Smuts, holism and a Greater Britain.142 The war experience had 
provoked strong opposition to military intervention abroad, particularly in 
aid of Britain and in support of objects perceived to be British or imperial 
rather than South African. Hertzog, who came to power in 1924 and 
remained in Tuinhuis until September 1939, would avoid foreign 
deployments, especially if these were ‘outside Africa.’ While still in 
opposition, he had opposed possible South African support for Britain 
during the Chanak crisis.143 In a speech at Clanwilliam, Dr D.F. Malan (NP, 
MP Calvinia) denied that South Africa had any agreement or obligation, 
legal or moral, to help Britain with her wars: ‘Die Dardanelle is nie ‘n 
druppel van ons bloed of ‘n sjïeling van ons geld wêrd nie, en Suidafrika 
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behoort hom neutral te verklaar.’144 Over the following month, the National 
Party made use of every opportunity to again lay down their traditional 
policy of neutrality. On 22 September 1922, Tielman Roos (NP, MP 
Lichtenburg) was quoted in the press: 
‘Ons is absoluut daarteen gekant om die Unie te stoot in die bynes van Eropese 
en Asiatiese politiek en oorloë. Dus sal die Nasionale Party veg teen die 
versending van ‘n enkele Afrikaner-Engels- of Afrikaans-sprekende – en die 
uitgawe van ‘n enkele pennie in verband daarmee. Ons mede-burgers van 
Engels, van Hollands en van ander afstamming, is vir ons te veel wêrd om 
hulle daar te verloor. Ons het hulle nodig om Suid-Afrika op te voer.’145 
The indifference and tendency toward withdrawal so manifest 
immediately after the war also declined in the following decades as the 
Nationalists grappled with difficulty of having to marry ideology and reality. 
With time three broad principles emerged. Firstly, the zone of deployment for 
the UDF was Africa. It would only be applied for the immediate defence of 
South Africa, where it would enjoy the advantages of technological asymmetry. 
By implication it also meant that the UDF would never again be deployed to 
Europe and European warfare, as such, would be avoided. Secondly, the UDF 
would be a small force, well-equipped for its purpose. There would be an 
emphasis on mounted infantry and a small air force, but little room for 
mechanisation as the lack of infrastructure in Africa pointed to little use for it. 
And, finally, the UDF would nonetheless be sufficiently lethal to deal with 
internal conflict, sufficiently potent not to run the risk of many own-force 
casualties. This is seem at Bulhoek, the Bondelswarts uprising, the Rand revolt 
of 1922, and the Ipumbu uprising of 1931, where the UDF, deployed in three of 
these cases to conduct punitive operations, had great psychological advantage. 
Nonetheless, the UDF was, like other forces, demobilised after 
November 1918 and large-scale rust-out took place from 1924, with the result 
that when the Second World War broke out in 1939, the Permanent and Active 
Citizen Forces were severely understrength and the Commandos, pet of the 
nationalist government, although reasonably equipped for their purpose, being 
rurally based and overwhelmingly Afrikaans and were not expected to support 
another ‘British’ war. Furthermore, much of the doctrine had not kept pace with 
technological developments. Mechanisation of ground forces and the 
application of new technology contrasted sharply with developments in Europe. 
Although South Africa had the industrial capacity for the development of 
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armour and mechanised forces, arguments based upon the nature of potential 
enemy forces, poor infrastructure and terrain inaccessibility combined with 
government policy and financial stringency resulted in nothing being done. 
Southern Africa, the focus of South African defence policy, was also thought to 
be unfavourable for mechanised warfare. Inadequate roads and multifarious 
geographic features concentrated energy on the development of the air arm for 
operations in Africa and a system of coastal defences to repel a sea assault, as 
well as a mix of British and Boer-type infantry supported by field artillery. As a 
result, an expeditionary force had to be prepared from scratch after September 
1939 and the first South Africans to serve in the Second World War only left 
the country in July 1940. 
Conclusion 
The First World War, fought for the future of liberal democracy, was 
necessary and had both meaning and purpose. It was not a futile waste, but 
fought for a cause. Yet, as Niall Ferguson has argued in The Pity of War, the 
war ‘derailed the benign civilising mission of the British Empire.’ Britain 
emerged from the conflict depleted and exhausted. This was the onset of 
retreat from empire, an uncomfortable reality that the most ardent 
imperialists around the Commonwealth had to accept after 1945. The 
moment the South African Unionists chose to seize, to draw South Africa 
closer to a Greater Britain, was ironically also the vehicle of the start of 
imperial decline. In South Africa the Nationalists, then largely still the 
Afrikaans far-right, came out strong and ready to take power with Labour in 
1924. 
The War differed from previous conflicts in terms of scope and 
intensity. Nations mobilised fully and the accompanying devastation 
unparalleled and the death toll unprecedented. For South Africa, attuned to 
small wars, limited ‘native’ campaigns, chiefly of pacification, and 
accustomed to low own-force casualties, the change to total warfare and the 
experience of the Western Front was cataclysmic. The South African stand 
at Longueval and Delville Wood lasted one week, almost precisely; from 
midday on July 14 to dusk on July 20, 1916. This was the second most 
expensive week in South African military history, surpassed only in 1942 
with the surrender at Tobruk. 
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More than a quarter of a million South Africans served on the different 
fronts: involving nearly twenty percent of the white male population. More than 
thirty thousand South Africans experienced the horror of trench warfare on the 
Western Front. Post-war governments wished to avoid such carnage in future 
and confine future operations to the continent of Africa. Politicians of all hue 
were determined not to send South Africans into the trenches again. As late as 
1939, the general staff did not foresee the eventuality of South Africans fighting 
in the European theatre again and this was included in the Smuts formula of 
September 1939. The campaigns in German South West and East Africa, on the 
other hand, were, as John Buchan noted, ‘frontier wars, fought for the 
immediate defence of her borders and her local interests.’146 Africa south of the 
equator was the presumed zone of deployment for the UDF, which would be a 
small force, but, sufficiently lethal and psychologically overwhelming, and 
well-equipped for this purpose. 
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